Supreme Court: No per se rule blocking “me, too” evidence of employment discrimination
February 27, 2008
The Supreme Court issued a decision Tuesday in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn (No. 06-1221, Feb. 26, 2008), clarifying the rules governing “me, too” evidence in employment discrimination cases.
Mendelsohn, after being terminated as part of a reduction-in-force, sued Sprint alleging age discrimination. In support of her claim, Mendelsohn sought to introduce testimony by several other Sprint employees who claimed their supervisors had discriminated against them because of age. However, none of these witnesses actually worked under the supervisors in Mendelsohn’s chain of command.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the admissibility of “me, too” evidence should be determined based upon the traditional definitions of relevance and admissibility contained in Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. In doing so, the Court refused to hold that such evidence is per se inadmissible.
Although procedurally complex, the Court’s Mendelsohn opinion ultimately requires the same analysis identified by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123 (6th Cir. 1997). Although “me, too” evidence will generally be considered irrelevant and prejudicial, trial courts possess the same wide discretion to admit or exclude such evidence as they enjoy in other rulings applying the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Supreme Court’s Mendelsohn opinion is available here.